Dr. Shireen M Mazari
Background:
It is a fallacy that arms control will eventually lead to disarmament. While the former refers to negotiated measures leading to curbs on acquiring new weapons, the latter term refers to a quantitative reduction in the total number of existing weapons – that is, the elimination of either specific armaments or as in the notion of General and Complete Disarmament (G&CD).
In some ways, in the post-45 period the very notion of global disarmament was undermined with the format of the UN Charter in which a system of collective security was envisaged through the UN’s Military Staff Committee and with the provision for collective defence by groups of states within regional military alliances. All this assumed the prevalence of, at least, a minimum level of arms.
As one comes to understand the politics of arms control and disarmament (AC&D), it becomes only too clear that there has been no effort to make war morally or legally unacceptable. Instead, all efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament have had a dual purpose:
First, in the case of the developed states, especially the nuclear weapon states, AC&D has evolved primarily in terms of economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness; second, in the case of developing states, especially potential nuclear proliferators, AC&D has been aimed at control of technology rather than an overall effort to reduce arms levels.
Perhaps the nuclear non-proliferation issue area reflects more starkly than any other the fact that arms control measures can often hinder disarmament by allowing states to agree to controlling specific arms/weapons, thereby avoiding general elimination.
Again, the contradictory approaches to AC&D are most clearly illustrated in the nuclear issue area. One can identify two distinct strands of nuclear non-proliferation that have dominated the international milieu since the US used nuclear weapons against Japan towards the final stages of the Second World War.
One: There is the US-centric strand premised on the discriminatory principle of distinguishing between horizontal and vertical proliferation as exemplified by the Non Proliferation Treaty.
Two: There is a universal, non-US-centric strand that is premised on a more rational approach towards the issue of nuclear proliferation. This seeks to stabilise and slow down proliferation at the global level while different regions evolve their own non-proliferation regimes.
Reflecting this approach are the regional non-proliferation treaties such as the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Bangkok Treaty which establish nuclear weapon free zones in Latin America, the South Pacific and Southeast Asia regions respectively – as well as the Pelindaba Treaty relating to a NWFZ in Africa.
Presently the FMCT negotiations in the CD have moved away from the original UN-envisaged non-discriminatory FMT to a discriminatory FMCT. The UN General Assembly had passed Res 48/75L on 16th December 1993 which sought negotiations for a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material treaty (FMT).
Then the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on 24th Jan 1994 appointed a Special Coordinator to solicit views of CD members on such a treaty. On 23rd March 1995 a weak and incomplete mandate, which fudged over major issues of difference, was agreed to and on 24th March the Report of the Special Coordinator Gerald Shannon of Canada was published containing the agreed mandate.
However, major differences prevented the adoption of any other UN GA resolution from 1994-1997. It was only in December 1998 that the GA resolution 53/77I was adopted by consensus so the CD resumed negotiations on a FMT during its 1999 session on the basis of the Shannon Report and its mandate.
FMCT politics
Unfortunately since then the CD has remained deadlocked not because of Pakistan and not only for the last two years but for almost fifteen years (with a few positive breaks), because the major powers, especially the US, refused to accept the notion of effective verifiable procedures as part of a FMT. It was only the Obama Administration that accepted the demand for effective verification.
The other reason for the stalemate in the CD since the last decade and a half has been the US refusal to move equally urgently on the other three major issues linked to a FMT in the CD: that is, nuclear disarmament, negative security guarantees and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Ironically there is already a growing international consensus on these three issues.
As for the FMT itself, while the UNGA resolution of 1993 called for a non-discriminatory FMT, the US and its allies have tended to move away from this international consensus by seeking merely a fissile material cut off treaty with no movement on reducing existing fissile material stockpiles so the haves will always be at an advantage over the have-nots.
The fact of the matter is that a FMT cannot simply be a non-proliferation measure it has to be linked to nuclear disarmament and hence the reduction in existing fissile stocks. Pakistan floated a proposal to break the deadlock in the CD earlier in February 2011 and reinvigorate its working by suggesting that it take up three agenda items first on which there is an evolving consensus while leaving aside the FMCT on which there is still no approaching consensus.
Pakistan continues to be accused unfairly of holding up the work agenda of the CD because of its opposition to the FMCT in its present form. To show that it was indeed committed to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, Pakistan immediately put forward this innovative suggestion. In fact, Pakistan, through its ambassador, demanded that other CD members should state their positions on these issues clearly just as Pakistan has done on the FMCT issue.
So what are the facts relating
To the FMT presently?
1. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has been debating the FMCT for some time and the issue has been held up for over a decade primarily because of the US and not Pakistan. Also countries like China want to see equal progress on other issues like PAROS. Therefore for the UN Secretary General and the US to declare that ONE country is holding up the FMCT in the CD is factually incorrect unless it is a reference to the last twelve years and US machinations on dealing with the four related issues together in the CD.
2. The Pakistani position is clear cut: we will sign a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) which first seeks reductions in existing stockpiles of nuclear material before the cut-off. Since the CD works on consensus, every country has an equal say on any agreement that comes out of it.
3. The US has certainly been contemplating bringing solely an FMCT delinked from other interlinked issues of the CD to the UN General Assembly. If it does so, there will be a debate and finally voting to get a text passed. But here one must recall the original UNGA consensus on negotiations for an FMT and that may not suit US interests.
4. Even if the US was to manage to pass a FMT text of its choosing through the UNGA, countries have a choice of whether to sign it as a Treaty or not, when it is opened for signatures. The Non Proliferation Treaty followed the Irish Resolution in the UN General Assembly and Pakistan like India used her right to remain outside of the Treaty.
5. In fact, an FMCT following a UNGA resolution should be welcomed by Pakistan because it would take the pressure off us in terms of consensus seeking that is bringing us under pressure in the CD in Geneva. Officially Pakistan has already stated that if the FMCT issue is taken out of the CD, Pakistan will stay away. Once an FMCT resolution goes through in the UNGA where consensus is not required it can take potential Treaty form and be opened for signatures. All Pakistan has to do is to refrain from signing since this is critical for our future. If the issue is dealt with by the US in this manner, it actually takes off pressure from Pakistan in the CD so let the US shift the FMCT issue from the CD to the UNGA.
6. Incidentally, UNGA resolutions are not binding either unlike UNSC resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
So let us not assume that Pakistan is about to be cornered in the UN by the US on the FMCT. In fact the reverse is true: taking the FMCT out of the CD and to the UNGA actually removes the tremendous pressure Pakistan is under presently in the CD in Geneva. So we should encourage the US on this count. The US is well aware of the problems and unintended consequences it may confront if it took the issue of the FMT out of the CD and into the UNGA. That is why, after the initial threats to do this, the Obama Administration now opposes attempts to move FMT negotiations out of the CD and into the UNGA as Elaine M. Grossman pointed out in her article dated 4th August 2011 in the Global Security Newswire.
The FMCT issue is critical to sustaining our credible minimum nuclear deterrence for the future which is why Pakistan is seeking an FMT which would include reductions in existing stockpiles before a cut-off date to create a more balanced situation for Pakistan. Actually the fissile material issue is primarily critical for Pakistan not the other five nuclear weapons states or India although India itself will not sign an FMCT so easily since it still has a disadvantage with regard to fissile material stockpiles in comparison with the P 5.
(Of course in about five to seven years down the road we may accept a FMCT because by then we will have built up a proportional fissile reserve to India’s as a result of our plutonium production picking up. But right now we can only go for a FMT as an FMCT would be suicidal.) Plutonium development is very essential for Pakistan as it allows greater flexibility if weapons production in terms of smaller yields etc.
As for the issue of why Pakistan is isolating itself this is at one level irrelevant because for issues of vital survival isolation is no reason to undermine our future but Pakistan is not isolated at all after all, India was one of only three countries (the other two being Bhutan and one other small state) that opposed the CTBT resolution in the UNGA (Pak, US etc all voted for it) and no one thought India was isolated on the CTBT issue! On the FMCT, there are other states who are not comfortable with it but are letting Pakistan take the frontline. However, even if we are alone we have to go this route on the fissile material issue.
But Pakistan is eager for the CD to focus on its more consensual agenda and the question is why are the major powers not moving on that front. China places PAROS as a high priority but no one is talking of fulfilling the NPT Article VI obligations for nuclear disarmament. Why?
If there is no move towards this goal then an FMCT is merely a measure to maintain the NPT discriminatory approach between the haves and have-nots rather than a serious step towards nuclear disarmament
