FMCT: Scope, and Country prospects

Dr. Maria Sultan

FMCT / FMT: the context
 December 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 48/75
 “non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices “
 Shannon Mandate: Universality, Non discrimination and effectively verifiable treaty.
Negotiations in the CD had been endorsed by all states party to the NPT at the 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. The conference also urged all NWS to place all material in access of military use to be placed under the IAEA Safeguards.
Shannon Mandate: basis
For future negotiations
 Following the Shannon Mandate the CD decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on a “Ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.
 The Ad Hoc Committee was to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
 The Ad Hoc Committee was to report to the CD on the progress of its work.
 Since than despite the renewed interest in negotiating a FMT/FMCT progress on the program of action failed to gain impetus.
NPT and FMCT
 Article VI of NPT “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
 Is FMCT a disarmament treaty? Or an arms control agreement is the fundamental question?
CTBT and FMCT
 Article 1 of CTBT prohibits States Parties from carrying out any nuclear explosion. It also prohibits any encouragement of or participation in the carrying out of any nuclear explosion.
 For nuclear testing one needs fissile material.
 Directly linked with the CTBT.
 Yet of the 44 specified countries, India, Pakistan, and North Korea still have not signed.
 36 have ratified the treaty.
 US have not ratified it yet, why?
Post 2001
 Bush administration move towards counter proliferation as the main tier of US non proliferation …… it boosted US led initiatives such MPI, CSI, PSI, Hague code of conduct and Preemption.
 Obama administration – argued for Global Zero’ and an early conclusion of FMCT/FMT.
 Commitment towards universality, and multilateralism to support non-proliferation goals. However the Nuclear posture review while stressing upon the importance of seeking a commencement of negotiations on a verifiable FMCT. Working on placing a quantitative cap on fissile material for weapons production.
Efforts for FMCT
 Obama’s Prauge Speech 2009,
 “Some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be stopped, cannot be checked — that we are destined to live in a world where more nations and more people possess the ultimate tools of destruction. Such fatalism is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.”
Current US perspective
On nuclear weapons
 ‘Increased investments in the nuclear weapons complex of facilities and personnel are required to ensure long term safety , security and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal.’ NPR 2010.
 Conditions that would allow US and others to give up nuclear weapons should be without risking ‘international instability and insecurity’ NPR 2010.
 Describing conditions in the international security environment , the NPR focuses on five key objectives of US nuclear weapons policies and posture.
‘Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism ; reducing the role of US nuclear weapons in the US national security strategy ; maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at lower nuclear forces; strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring US allies and partners; and sustaining a safe , secure and effective nuclear arsenal.’ NPR 2010.

Scope of the treaty: US Perspective
 The Treaty should, of course, prohibit the production of all fissile materials (plutonium Pu, highly enriched uranium HEU) for use in nuclear weapons
 Production facilities should be closed and dismantled or only be used for civilian or non-explosive purposes. Verification?
 Production facilities are reprocessing plants (separating Pu from spent radioactive fuel) and uranium enrichment facilities.
 The FM(C)T should require that all civilian stocks of fissile materials and stocks declared excess for weapons purposes not be used for weapons and therefore be safeguarded. Verifying only non production would not be enough!
 Could include verified commitments that fissile material to be used for non-weapon military purposes (e.g. naval fuel) not be used for weapons.
Entry into Force (EiF)
 An FM(C)T is particularly relevant for those 8 or 9 States active in the nuclear field that do not have a safeguards agreement covering all their nuclear materials.
 In view of the great differences between these States it would not be wise to demand ratification by all those States before EiF is possible. Better to start with the Treaty quickly and get experience with the application of the extended safeguards, and have a serious review after, say, ten years.
Related issues
 The issues.
– Existing stockpiles relates to the scope of the treaty ?
– Verification mechanism
– Lack of transparency.
– Issue of surplus stocks
– Only deals with preventing production of nuclear weapons explosive devices
– Does not prevent from developing nuclear material for other purposes.
– non internationally binding non proliferation agreement
– policy of hedging
International security conditions
 Linkage problem
 PAROS (Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space)
 NSA (Negative Security Assurance)
 Nuclear Disarmament
 Indo-US Deal ,
 Undermining Additional protocol and non proliferation achievements.
 Guaranteed Strategic fuel reserve to India
 unsafe guarded nuclear facilities in addition Fast breeder program nuclear submarines almost 2.5 tones of nuclear material,
 Slow progress on the separation of fuel cycle.
 ICBM and ABM – technology inflow and destabilizing deterrence.
 Cold Start Doctrine CSD
Pakistan and FMCT
 Pakistan is blocking the commencement of FMCT negotiations because of its supreme national security interests.
 Pakistan is blocking negotiation on several accounts:
 NSG waiver to India
 Indo-US 123 nuclear deal
 Preparation of Cold Start Doctrine
 Pursuance of BMD programme
 India’s conventional arms modernization
 Rising asymmetries in fissile material stocks
 US commitment to make efforts for India’s membership for UN Security Council and other export control regimes
 Indian ICBM test on 19th April, 2012 and missile proliferation
Next Step in Strategic Partnership NSSP
 January 2004, the United States and India agreed to expand cooperation in three specific areas.
A) Civilian nuclear activities
B) Civilian space programs
C) High technology trade
 In addition, both agreed to expand dialogue on missile defense.
 Mantra was “common values and common interests”.
Indo-U.S Nuclear Deal
 July 18, 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush signed Nuclear Deal, under which India agreed:
 Separate its civil and military nuclear facilities.
 Place all its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards
 The United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India (10 October, 2008).
 2009 India-IAEA safeguards agreement signed.
Rationale behind the Deal
 Economic considerations
 U.S. expects the deal would bring in $150 billion in the next decade, of which the U.S. wants a share.
 Strategic Interests
 U.S wants to increase strategic ties with India and to see a viable counter-weight to the growing influence of China.
NSG waiver Indo-US Deal
 NSSP-Indo-U.S Nuclear Deal
 Context: is it about Energy?
 Rationale behind the Deal
 New Category of Safeguards.
 Implication on Weapon Development
 Impact on deterrence stability in South Asia
 Way Forward
Context: is it about Energy?
Indian Stated Objectives
 To increase the production of nuclear power generation from its present capacity of 4,000 MWe to 20,000 MWe in the next decade.
 To expand and fuel its civilian nuclear power generation capacity from its current output of about 4GWe (GigaWatt) electricity) to a power output of 20GWe by 2020.
Implication on Weapon Development
 Estimated annual Uranium production300 tonnes
 Estimated annual Uranium consumption450 tonnes
 Gap of 150 Uranium tonnes (strategic fuel reserves)
 India’s estimated reserve of uranium represents only 1% of the world.
India-IAEA Safeguard Agreement
 The agreement currently applies safeguards to six Indian nuclear reactors under safeguards agreements concluded between 1971 and 1994.
 It aims to bring a total of 14 Indian reactors under safeguards by 2014.
IAEA protocol agreement with India
 Application of storage, retransfer and physical protection measures, set out in IAEA INFCIRC 225/Rev.4
 By-product materials would be subject to the IAEA document GOV/1999/19/Rev.2.
 The Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols with IAEA (GOV/2008/30).
 Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.
NSG Waiver to India
 NSG aims “to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.“
 On 6 September 2008 India got NSG Waiver.
 Under the waiver, India can proceed to import uranium fuel, nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for its civilian nuclear programme.
 It can also divert domestic uranium exclusively for weapons purposes.
Indian Triad
 India has acquired its assured second strike capability, Chakra II from Russia.
 In 2011, India’s Army Strategic Forces Command carried out a user-trial test of the 2000 km-range Agni-II missile.
 India also carried out a development test of the 3500-km range Agni-IV missile.29 After more test flights, it is expected to be in operation by 2013.
 India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) plans to test the 5000-km range Agni-V missile in early 2012 and to have it ready to enter service by 2014.
 DRDO also is developing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) for the Agni- missiles.
 India continues to produce HEU at its Rare Materials Plant (RMP), a centrifuge uranium enrichment facility in Rattehalli, Mysore (Karnataka).
 The HEU is believed to be enriched to between 30 and 45% uranium-235, i.e., much less than weapon-grade, and is intended for India’s nuclear submarine propulsion program.
 In November 2011, the Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission confirmed that the Rattehalli site was “more than adequate” for fueling the “submarine fleet”.
 Second enrichment complex, the “Special Material Enrichment Facility, in Karnataka.
 This facility will not be safeguarded since India is “keeping the option open of using it for multiple roles.”
 These roles could include enrichment of HEU for fueling the nuclear submarine fleet, production of enriched uranium for weapon purposes.
Analysis: New Category of Safeguards
 The India-IAEA safeguards agreement is an entirely new category of safeguards created, which is India-specific.
 India is neither under the safeguards provisions of INFCIRC/66 nor following the safeguards as prescribed in INFCIRC/153.
 By creating a new category of safeguards a structural change in NPT has been brought in with no criterion-based approach.
 This agreement is portrayed as a bilateral agreement but effectively the agreement as stated in the preamble is an umbrella agreement allowing India to carry out trade with IAEA member states without any costs.
 Its violations of the international non-proliferation regime.
 A total disregard for regional realities is likely to lead to strategic instability in the region with the high point of an arms race being a natural outcome.
 Indo-U.S Nuclear deal: Impacting Deterrence stability in South Asia.
“US-India Nuclear Agreement would have implications on strategic stability as it would enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from un-safeguarded nuclear reactors”.
Quantitative improvement in
Indian Nuclear arsenal
 The Nuclear Deal has indirect ramifications on deterrence stability in South Asia.
 This would make India eligible to purchase nuclear fuel for the 14 reactors from the US and the NSG.
 This would free up its indigenous nuclear fuel (uranium) for its nuclear weapons programme.
 It would allow a significant and rapid expansion in India’s nuclear arsenal.
 Indo-US ‘123 Agreement’ would greatly enhance the Indian capability of developing more nuclear warheads, as it provides assurances on uninterrupted nuclear fuel supply.
 Section 2.2 (e) fully commits the US to help India in developing “a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors.”
 The US outlines its commitments to assure the fuel supply from NSG in the Section 5.6 (a) and Section 14.5 of the ‘123 Agreement’.
 India would be able to reprocess the spent fuel from the imported nuclear reactors and would convert it into fuel for its fast breeder reactors, which would not come under the IAEA safeguards.
 Section 6 (iii) of the ‘123 Agreement’ also highlights that “the United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors.
Qualitative improvement in
Indian Nuclear arsenal
 The ‘123 Agreement’ does not have any provision according to which India will give up its right to nuclear testing.
 It is discriminatory in the sense that it has bestowed India with all the benefits of a nuclear weapons state without imposition of any restraining obligations.
 IAEA safeguards would not be able to stop the flow of valuable scientific, technical information and expertise from civilian nuclear facilities to military facilities, but only the material.
 India may shift trained personnel from civilian nuclear facilities to military facilities which would result in the production of more qualitative and sophisticated nuclear warheads and delivery systems.
Scope: production – past, present and future
 Pakistan wants an FMT, not FMCT
 Treaty should cover stocks, not just ban production
 “A cut-off in the manufacturing of fissile material must be accompanied by a mandatory programme for the elimination of asymmetries in the possession of fissile material stockpiles by various states. Such transfer of fissile material to safeguards should be made first by states with huge stockpiles, both in the global and regional context.”
 “A fissile material treaty must provide a schedule for a progressive transfer of existing stockpiles to civilian use and placing these stockpiles under safeguards so that the unsafeguarded stocks are equalized at the lowest level possible.”
 A freeze will only ensure a strategic status quo on one side destabilizing deterrence stability .
Verifiable, Non-intrusive
And Non-discriminatory
 Pakistan wants verifiable treaty
 Verification should cover declarations and stocks
 Not too intrusive
 Non-discriminatory – all subject to same standard of verification
 How can this be done while keeping secret the size of fissile material stock and the number of weapons
 Capabilities do not control the relationship unless arms control aims at deterrence stability?
Linked with India
 Position on FMT is dependent on India’s nuclear capabilities:
 How many weapons, what kind, size/quality of stocks.
 “Pakistan cannot allow India to once again destabilize the balance of deterrence in future through asymmetry in the level of stockpiles”,
 Significant asymmetry only if include India’s un-safeguarded power reactor plutonium stocks
 Pakistan is not likely to sign or ratify an FMCT unless India does so at the same time
 Issues require careful handling.
Response to the US-India Nuclear Deal
 August 2007 National Nuclear Command Authority
 “the [US-India] agreement would have implications on strategic stability as it would enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from un safeguarded nuclear reactors… and expressed firm resolve to meet the requirements of future credible minimum deterrence.”
 Pakistan expanding its production capacity
 More efficient centrifuges
 Two additional production reactors,
 New reprocessing plant
Pakistan’s Current Position
“Pakistan, along with several other countries, was of the firm view that the CD should have a balanced approach and pursue all items on its agenda, taking into account the well-established principle of equal and undiminished security for all states.”
25 January 2012,
Statement by Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Pakistan
2 Recent Statements
 “Consensus on FMCT negotiations has eluded the CD for 15 years. Pakistan’s objection to a FMCT has only existed since 2009. We want to ask who is responsible for the deadlock on this issue for more than a decade before 2009?”
 “The record also shows that while Pakistan has objected to negotiations on a FMCT, we have not blocked negotiations on any of the three other so-called core issues of the CD, i.e. Nuclear Disarmament, NSAs and PAROS.”
Zamir Akram,
Ambassador of Pakistan in the CD Mar 20, 2012
Implications for Pakistan
 Only one positive aspect:
• Recognition as Nuclear Weapon State
 Negative fall-outs:
• Creating security dilemma
• Perturbing strategic stability in South Asia
• Capping country’s potential to safeguard its supreme national interests
• Establishing asymmetries in fissile material stocks
NCA statements
 On December 14, 2010
 “Pakistan will never accept discriminatory treatment and that it rejects any effort to undermine its strategic deterrence. Pakistan will not be a party to any approach that is prejudicial to its legitimate national security interests.”
 2011 statement
 “has declared that Pakistan will not support a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty unless existing stocks of fissile material are also made part of a treaty”
 Arms control and multilateralism only work when regional interlocutors and the international security articture recognize the security dilemmas of the states if they truly want progress.
Conclusion: Way Forward
 India should make some legally binding Non-Proliferation commitment
 NSG should take principle stance on technology enable states to make foundation for Global Export Control.
 Gap between legality and reality have to be reduced
 Decentralization, de-emphasis on deterrence credibility by Triad development
 Regional Arm Control Agreement.
 Energy cooperation between Nuclear Supplier States need New Gold Standard.